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WORKER'S COMPENSATION CORNER
Summary Termination of Benefits:
An Analysis of the Baksalary Case
Hon. Irvin Stander*
The Uhited States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania approved a Consent Decree on July 30, 1984, resolving the
major remedial issues in Baksalary, et al v. Smith, et al., 591 F. Supp.
179 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
This case was a class action attacking Section 413(a) of the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act whereby a recipient's benefits
could be terminated in certain situations without prior notice or hearing.
The same Court had previously held, on February 1, 1984, that Section
413(a) of the Act was unconstitutional as a deprivation of recipient's
property rights without due process of law, at 579 F. Supp. 218.
This article reviews the Baksalary decision, the status of its
implementation, and the progress of the appeals filed therefrom.
Statutory Provisions and Earlier Cases
Prior to the extensive amendments of the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Law in 1972, Section 413 of the Act (77 P.S. Sec. 774) pro-
vided that the filing of a Petition to Terminate or Modify compensation
by the employer acted as a supersedeas suspending payments of compensation,
in whole or in part, as specified in the petition. Of course, this
stoppage was not final, but was subject to the later decision on the merits
of the case made by the Referee.
This provision in the Pennsylvania Act was challenged in the
Federal courts in Silas v. Smith (361 F. Supp. 1187, E.D. Pa. 1973), and a
three-judge constitutional court filed its decision in 1973 holding that
there was no violation of due process and no "state action" was involved.
In its decision, the Court characterized workers' compensation arrangements
as one of private contract in which periodic payments can be terminated
pending resolution of the underlying dispute. The act under attack in
Silas was optional and elective in nature, since workers' compensation
did not become mandatory in Pennsylvania until 1974.
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According to the author, the case under review will affect at least
twenty-one states which have automatic termination procedures In their
Worker's Compensation Laws.
An earlier version of this article appeared in the August 20, 1984 issue
of the Pennsylvania Law Journal-Reporter.
The sweeping amendments adopted in Pennsylvania in 1972 modified
the termination procedures in the Act. The new Section 413(a) (Act of
3/29/72, P.L. 152, 77 P.S. 774, 1982 Supp.) provided that an automatic
supersedeas could be Invoked in two situations: (1) when the petition
alleged that the employee returned to work without any loss of earnings;
or (2) when the petition alleged that the employee has recovered, and the
petition was accompanied by a physician's affidavit of recovery based on
an examination made within 15 days of the filing of the petition.
In all other situations, no automatic stoppage was allowed, but
the petition could be designated as a Request for Supersedeas to be heard
promptly by the Referee, and decided by him on an Interlocutory basis
pending hearings on the merits.
While the 1972 provision would prevent stoppage of benefits in a
partial-recovery situation, it still allowed stoppage on the physician-
supported allegation of recovery, or allegation of return to work.
An attempt in the state courts to invalidate this supersedeas
procedure as lacking in due process was unsuccessful. In Henderson v.
WCAB (452 A.2d 277, 1982), the Commonwealth Court held that the termination
procedure did not involve state action, and was not a violation of due
process, citing Silas v. Smith for support.
Special Federal Court Invalidates Automatic Stoppages
In 1976, another Federal attack on the supersedeas provision was
commenced. A claimant with the unlikely - but appropriate - name
of Baksalary, and several others, filed an action attacking the automatic
stoppage provision for lack of due process under Section 19B3 of the Civil
Rights Act (Baksalary, et al v. Smith, et al, 579 F. Supp. 218, E.D.
Pa. 1984). A Federal judge ordered the convening of a three-judge consti-
tutional court because of the challenge on a State statute; and in 1978
the Baksalary case was declared a class action suit under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. In a class action suit, notice to the non-named members
of the class is not required.
A five-year period of discovery ensued, resulting in a comprehensive
stipulation of facts in which the parties detailed the provisions of the
Pennsylvania Act and the nature of its termination proceedings. Defendant's
motion for dismissal was then argued and a decision on the motion was
deferred.
On February 1, 1984, the three-judge Federal court filed its
decision invalidating Section 413(a) of the Act, and declaring it to be an
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process. The majority
opinion was written by Judge Pollak, with a concurring opinion by Circuit
Court Judge Adams. All three judges, Adams, Pollak and District Court Judge
Green, joined in the majority and concurring opinions.
Citing Matthews v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319, 1976), the three-judge
court held that since the Pennsylvania Act allows supersedeas of benefits
immediately upon the filing of Defendant's petition, without any prior
notice of stoppage or any opportunity for the Claimant to be heard,
Defendant's actions constituted a deprivation of the Claimant's
constitutionally protected property interest. This was especially true
since any later decision on the merits of Defendant's Petition for
Termination consumed more than a year after stoppage, causing the Claimant
to lose significant income during a period when his ability to replace this
loss through borrowing was sharply diminished. The basis for this holding
was the prior determination by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Matthews case(dealing with social security disability benefits) that the "interest of
an individual in continued receipt of benefits is a statutorily created
property right protected by the Constitution."
The Baksalary court also found that the necessary element of "state
action" was present since Plaintiff's deprivation exists under the "Color
of state law." This is so because the stoppage provision is a state-
created right or privilege which required the filing of a Petition with the
Bureau, together with a Physician's Affidavit of Recovery; or an allegation
of Claimant's return to work without any loss of wages. It was'also pointed
out that employer's improper stoppage of benefits without the necessary
documents would subject him to statutory penalties up to.20% of withheld pay-
ments.
In connection with the Court's holding that "state action" existed,
the Court cited the 5-to-4 Supreme Court decision in Lugar v. Edmunson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), where a court clerk's issuance of a Writ
of Attachment based on an ex-parte petition was held to be "state action"
since it was a special filing process directed by the state.
The opinion also declared that the deprivation of benefits was
caused by a state "actor" based on the following facts:
(a) The state, as an employer, could itself invoke the automatic
stoppage provisions;
(b) Self-insured public employers could use this procedure;
(c) The state-operated workmen's compensation insurance fund also
made use of the automatic stoppage method;
(d) Even the private carriers and self-insured employers jointly
participated in state action because they were required to
file a petition with the state, and the petition had to be
reviewed for formal compliance by the state authorities.
On the issue of "lack of due process" the Court relied on the follow-
ing established factors:
(a) No notice of the stoppage was required until after the
suspension of benefits;
(b) Restoration of benefits could only be accomplished by long
delayed post facto rights gained after a trial on the merits
of the case;
(c) Prior to suspension of payments, Claimant had no right to
present any countervailing evidence;
(d) There was no independent check by the state authorities on the
sufficiency or accuracy of the Physician's Affidavit of
Recovery.
(e) The automatic supersedeas procedure was not sufficiently
reliable to protect Claimant against erroneous termination.
Court Reviews Earlier Cases On Automatic Stoppage
The Court then reviewed the decided cases on the subject of termin-
ations made without notice or hearing, and cited these decisions:
(a) Matthews v. Eldridge, (424 U.S. 319 (1976), holds that some
kind of hearing must be held prior to stoppage of payments in
social security disability benefit cases. In Matthews, the
beneficiary could present written evidence prior to the stoppage
of benefits.
(b) The Iowa Supreme Court invalidated summary terminations of
compensation benefits in Auxier v. Woodward State Hospital
School, 266 N.W. 2d 139 (1978); cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1979).
(c) In West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that
termination of compensation benefits must be preceded by
written notice, an opportunity to present countervailing
information, and an evidentiary hearing. See Mitchell v.
State Work. Comp. Bureau, 256 S.E. 2d 1 (1979).
(d) The Oregon Appellate Court decreed that there must be preliminary
notice of cessation of benefits listing the evidence upon
which It is based; and giving Claimant an opportunity to
respond. See Carr v. SAIF Corp., 670 P.2d 1037, 1046 (Oregon
CA, 1983).
(e) In North Dakota (Steele v. North Dakota Work. Comp. Bureau,
273 N.W. 2d 692, 1978), the Court required notice of stoppage
and a formal hearing if any material fact is in dispute.
(f) Another state with a similar holding is Maine. See Merrifield
v. Hannaford Co., 409 A. 2d 1313 (S. Ct. Maine, 1980).
The parties in the Baksalary case were then asked to submit competing
orders for the implementation of the Court's decision, which they proceeded
to do. On March 15, 1984, the Court entered a Declaratory Judgment holding
that the automatic supersedeas provision in Section 413(a) was unconstitutional
and invalid. This order also denied the request of several named Defendants
that the Court should direct the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to adopt a
procedural alternative to the automatic supersedeas procedure which would
have established a two-tier paper hearing process in connection with stoppage
of benefits. The Court also scheduled oral arguments on the remaining
proposals for relief.
Parties Agree To A Consent Decree
At this juncture, marathon settlement discussions were conducted
by the named Plaintiffs and Defendants and an agreement for a Consent
Decree was reached including these principal provisions in the Decree:
(1) There would be a prospective injunction which enjoined all
insurance carriers and self-insured employers from ever again
using the automatic supersedeas provision in the Act; and the
imposition of a duty on the Worker's Compensation Bureau to
review all future termination petitions to determine compliance
with the injunction.
(2) There would be a series of restorative injunctions giving
Claimants the following rights:
First: Where a supersedeas was based on a Doctor's Affidavit of
Recovery, Claimant must receive a special supersedeas hearing
within 60 days of approval of the decree, if benefits were
terminated prior to February 1, 1984, and no decision on the
merits had as yet been made; except where the Referee's
evidentiary hearings on the merits had been completed.
Second: Where a supersedeas was based on allegations of
return to work without loss in pay, and Claimant returns a
questionnaire showing either loss of wages or compensable
unpaid medical bills, Claimant,must also receive a special
supersedeas hearing.
Third: Special supersedeas hearings were to be conducted
under the Referee's Rules of Procedure allowing the parties to
introduce medical reports, affidavits, testimony or other
relevant material. See 34 Pa. Code, Sections 131.31 through
131.34.
Fourth: The Referee must issue his interlocutory decision
on the special supersedeas hearings within seven days from
the hearing (that is - 67 days from final order approving
Consent Decree) or compensation benefits must be resumed
prospectively, unless Claimant's actions cause the delay;
which fact must be certified in writing by the Referee.
Fifth: If the Referee denies the employer's request for
supersedeas, compensation benefits must be resumed, in whole
or in part, prospectively and/or retroactively, as may be
ordered by the Referee.
Sixth: Where the evidentiary hearings on the merits have
been completed, no special supersedeas hearing are required,
but the Referee must issue his decision on the merits of the
case within 67 days from the final order approving the Consent
Decree, or compensation benefits must be resumed prospectively,
unless Claimant's action cause the delay; which fact must
be certified in writing by the Referee.
Seventh: Where the automatic supersedeas was taken in
petitions filed after the decision of February 1, 1984,
Claimant's rights to relief would be specially decided by
the Court, and not under the terms of the Consent Decree.
Eighth: Plaintiff's class action counsel will monitor compli-
ance with the Decree, and the Bureau and insurers must furnish
periodic reports to facilitate such monitoring.
Ninth: Plaintiff's class-action counsel will receive a
reasonable counsel fee payable by the named and class
Defendants on a proportionate basis. The maximum fee was set
at $300,000.00.
(3) An important provision of the proposed Consent Decree stated
that the Commonwealth and the Workers' Compensation Bureau
cannot be held responsible for any delays; and are absolved from
any monetary responsibility in failing to schedule or delaying
the scheduling of any special supersedeas hearings for circum-
stances beyond its control.
(4) The proposed Decree provided for a "Fairness Hearing" with
the allowance of written objections and oral presentations
in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
mandated the mailing of a comprehensive "Notice Package"
to all named and identified class Plaintiffs; and all named
and non-named Defendant insurance carriers and self-insured
employers.
The Court, after argument, gave its provisional approval to the pro-
posed Consent Decree on May 14, 1984; scheduled the Fairness Hearing for
June 18, 1984; and listed the final date for submission of written objections
as June 13, 1984. The Bureau then mailed out about 5,000 notice packages
to all named and non-named parties in interest.
Fairness Hearing Considered Objections To Consent Decree
Written objections to the proposed Consent Decree were filed by
several class Defendants and were presented at the Fairness Hearing held
on June 18, 1984. These were the principal objections:
(1) The proposed special supersedeas hearing procedure is too
cumbersome; and that the 67-day period was too restrictive
in time.
(2) Automatic supersedeas stoppages filed between February 1, 1984
(date of decision) and March 15, 1984 (date of Declaratory
Judgment) should be accorded the same remedial treatment as
those taken prior to February 1, 1984; and should not be made
the subject of special relief by the Court.
(3) The proposed Consent Decree should be modified to differentiate
between automatic supersedeas taken on the basis of physician's
affidavits as against those taken on the basis of return to
work without loss of earning power; in order to prevent dual
payment of compensation benefits and salary.
After the Fairness Hearing, counsel for the named Plaintiffs and
Defendants and counsel for a major objector, at the Court's suggestion,
agreed to a clarifying amendment of the proposed decree to provide that a
Claimant is not entitled to receive both compensation payments and salary
during any period of time when Claimant has actually returned to work at
wages equal to or greater than his or her pre-injury wages.
Court's Final Opinion And Order Filed July 30, 1984
The per curiam opinion of the Court reviewed the history of this
litigation including the liability opinion of February 1, 1984; the various
suggested orders for implementation; the Court's Memorandum and Order of
March 15, 1984 containing its Declaratory Judgment, and its reactions to
several of the suggested orders; the settlement negotiations leading to a
proposed Consent Decree; the Court's preliminary approval of that proposal
with the arrangement for a Fairness Hearing upon the mailing of compre-
hensive "Notice packages" to all named and non-named parties; and the
Fairness Hearing procedure with a description of the various objections
filed.
The Court then found that the proposed Consent Decree meets all of
the standards set by the Federal courts, and declared that it represents
a fair, adequate and reasonable compromise between "the possible extreme
results in this case," both for the Plaintiffs and Defendants.
As to the objections made by various non-named parties, the Court
came to the following conclusions:
(l) As to the "return to work" situations, the Court states "we
do not understand the Consent Decree as creating any entitle-
ment to the concurrent receipt of wages and of compensation
benefits. . . . No Claimant may properly receive both." The
Court then adopted the clarifying amendmentagreed to by the
parties, as set forth above, reiterating that Sections 413(c)
and 306(b) of the Act still remain in full force and effect.
(2) With respect to the proposal that the time limits set for the
Special Supersedeas Hearings and Decisions should be increased,
the Court held that this objection had no merit, especially
in view of the fact that the Bureau of Workers' Compensation
had agreed that the time frames set in the proposed Consent
Decree were feasible and could be met.
(3) As to the objection fixing the allocation of Plaintiffs'
counsel fee among the Defendants on a proportionate basis
equal to their contributions to the Workmen's Compensation
Administration Fund, the Court felt that this method of allo-
cation was a fair and reasonable one.
(4) Several non-named Plaintiffs whose termination cases had been
completely concluded on the merits with a final Referee's
decision objected because they claimed they should also
receive relief from the automatic supersedeas asserted against
them. The Court held that since these completed terminations
were not included in the scope of this case, their objections
could not be considered in the Baksalary litigation; especially
since these Claimants have already received full hearings and
a decision on the merits of their claims.
(5) With respect to the objection that the remedies in the pro-
posed decree should also apply to non-named Defendants who
invoked the automatic supersedeas procedure between February 1,
1984 (the liability decision date) and March 15, 1984 (the
date of the Declaratory Judgment), the Court reviewed the case
law on retroactivity of constitutional holdings. Based on these
decisions, the Court determined that its Declaratory Judgment
of March 15, 1984 must be retroactively applied to all cases
where automatic supersedeas was invoked after its liability
decision of February 1, 1984.
In its accompanying Order, the Court formally approved the Consent
Decree; declared the invocation of the automatic supersedeas provision
after February 2, 1984 a deprivation of the involved Claimants' property
without due process of law; and ordered such withheld payments to be made
within 30 days after this Order, including interest and medical expenses.
These payments must continue pending a decision by the Referee on the
merits of the termination petition.
Implementation Of The Consent Decree
Promptly after the Court's Order of July 30, 1984, the Bureau of
Workers' Compensation and its Referees prepared and mailed appropriate
Notices for the Special Supersedeas Hearings in those cases identified as
being subject to the terms of the Consent Decree.
The Referees then held such hearingsand issued Interlocutory Orders
granting or denying supersedeas in whole or in part upon consideration of
the documents and other evidence presented at the hearings. The Special
Supersedeas Hearings and their decisions were all completed within the
67-day period prescribed in the Consent Decree and its approval order.
As to those automatic supersedeas cases in which the evidentiary
records had been completed, the Referees filed final decisions on the
merits of the underlying Petitions for Termination within the same 67-day
time limit set forth in the Court's Order of July 30, 1984.
According to the records of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation,
the Referees issued 603 Special Supersedeas Orders, and 673 final decisions
in the termination proceedings which were identified as being subject to
the provisions of the Baksalary decision because they were commenced by
automatic supersedeas stoppage of compensation.
The Court's Liability and "Fairness" Orders Have Been Appealed
The liability opinion of the three-judge District Court is reported
at 579 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1984), and the Court's subsequent opinion
approving a Classwide Consent Decree is reported at 591 Supp. 1279 (E.D.
Pa. 1984). Within the allowable periods, several non-named Defendants in
the original class action, being Allstate, Argonaut, Harleysville, Royal,
Travelers and Wausau Insurance Companies and Sun Company, Inc., a self-
insurer, filed appeals to the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit on
August 29, 1984; and to the United States Supreme Court (October Term,
1984' No. 84-768).
Initially, these appellants sought a stay of the Consent Decree
from the District Court pending disposition of their appeals to the Third
Court and the U.S. Supreme Court. By order filed on September 24, 1984,
that request was denied.
In the Circuit Court, appellants moved, not for a stay of the Consent
Decree, but rather for a stay of proceedings of that Court's action pending
the disposition of the jurisdictional issue to be considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Such a stay was ordered by the Circuit Court on October 29,
1984.
However, in the meantime, appellants also filed their brief on the
merits in the Circuit Court, addressed solely to the constitutional holding
of the District Court, but not raising any question about the propriety of
the Court's approval of the Consent Decree. Plaintiffs then moved the
Circuit Court to strike appellant's brief and dismiss their appeal. On
November 26, 1984, the Circuit Court denied the motion to strike and referred
the motion to dismiss to the merits panel of that Court. As of this writing
that motion to dismiss is still pending.
Appellants Filed A Jurisdictional Statement
In the U.S. Supreme Court, appellants filed a Jurisdictional State-
ment, on or about November 15, 1984, in which they advanced the following
arguments:
(1) These appellants never had an opportunity to be heard on the
merits of the constitutional determination "which directly
and dramatically affects each one of them adversely by a final
order providing for individual injunctive prohibition, as
well as liability for an apportioned share of Plaintiffs'
attorney's fee."
(2) With respect to the issue of due process, they urged:
(a) The risk of erroneous deprivation of Workmen's Compensation
benefits "is at least subject to a degree of balancing by
the risk of erroneous payments by the employer. . . ." so
as to protect against unwarranted payments which would
affect the local economic structure.
(b) Workers' Compensation is not akin to a welfare payment, and
the requirement for "some kind of hearing" is met by a
considerable degree of "process" in the medical examination
by a licensed physician, where the Claimant can voice and
explain his complaints; the required physician's affidavit
of full recovery and ability to resume his pre-injury duties
without limitation; the formal petition for determination
filed with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation within 15 days
after the doctor's examination; and the subsequent assignment
of the termination petition to a Referee for formal hearings
on the merits and a determination.
(c) The District Court Initially sought to apply the "notice"
and "opportunity-to-be-heard" requirement to cases where the
stoppage of benefits was based on a Termination Petition
alleging a "return to work with no loss of earnings," -
cases where there could be no "deprivation of property" argu-
ment made.
(d) The Pennsylvania Courts, in Henderson v. WCAB, 452 A.2d 277
(1982), held "that the suspension of an employee's Workmen's
Compensation benefits by a private insurance carrier does
not violate the employee's rights to due process."
(3) With respect to the issue of "state action," they urged:
(a) The deprivation here is not caused by the exercise of some
right created by the state since the present version of
Section 413(a), including the so-called "automatic supersedeas
provision," did not create any rights or benefits to the
employer, but rather severely limited and restricted the
suspension of benefits on an interim basis as contrasted
with the earlier version of Section 413(a) which allowed
unlimited supersedeas stoppage of benefits.
(b) The deprivation here is not effected by a state "actor"
because there is not present any overt action by a state official
to take or withhold property, but merely "passive administration"
by the state in connection with the filing of the petition
followed by the action on the part of the private insurance
carriers or self-insurers in suspending payments. So far as
the State's action against its own employees is concerned; or
the use by State Workmen's Insurance Fund of the automatic
stoppage provisions, these actions by the State or the State
Fund are not "by virtue of their being state officials but
rather and only because they are in the position of traditional
employers and/or insurance carriers."
(4) The question of deprivation of "due process" by "state actions"
has not previously been addressed by the Supreme Court in a
Workmen's Compensation context, and should be reviewed by
that Court because of its national implications.
Plaintiffs Filed A Motion To Dismiss Or Affirm
On or about December 15, 1984, the Plaintiffs filed in the U.S.
Supreme Court a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, or in the alternative, to
affirm the Lower Court's decision, in which they propounded the following
arguments:
(1) The Supreme Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this
appeal because the appellants failed to appropriately raise the
constitutional issue in the District Court by motion for
reconsideration of the liability decision or otherwise, leaving
the only issue in the case the propriety of the Consent Decree,
which can only be raised on their appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals. Therefore, the Supreme Court appeal should be
Dismissed.
(2) The Supreme Court should, in the alternative, summarily affirm
the judgment of the District Court since the questions presented
by the appellants are so insubstantial as to not merit review
because of the unchallenged findings of fact made below, and
the District Court's application of the Supreme Court's
established governing precedents.
(3) Answering appellants'arguments on the "due process" issue, the
Plaintiffs argue:
(a) Under Pennsylvania Law, Plaintiffs have a state-created
property interest which cannot be deprived without due process
of law.
(b) The 14th Amendment safeguards, by procedural protection, the
security of inerests a person has acquired in specific benefits.
(c) Workers' Compensation benefits are not a privilege which can
be unilaterally withdrawn. They can only be terminated for
cause.
(d) Such benefits cannot be terminated without prior notice and
the opportunity for "some kind of hearing" in order to satisfy
due process requirements.
(4) On the issue of the existence of requisite "state action,"
the Plaintiffs argue:
(a) The District Court's holding was logically mandated, given
the state-created nature of the automatic supersedeas pro-
ceeding, and the direct participation by the state in the
termination of Plaintiff's benefits.
(b) The state provided the exclusive procedure by which benefits
could be unilaterally terminated.
(c) The state exercised the automatic supersedeas provision for
its own employees, and through its agency, the State Workmen's
Insurance Fund.
(d) As to the exercise of this termination procedure by any private
carrier or self-insured private employers; the District Court
properly found that there was joint participation with the
state as an "actor" in order to accomplish automatic termination
of benefits since the petitions were required to "pass muster"
by the state under the standards of the Act.
(5) The appellant's argument that due process is satisfied by
Claimant's medical examination by a Defendant's doctor ignores
the requirement that a hearing be held by an impartial decision-
maker.
(6) The absence of prior notice of termination, the lack of any
opportunity to challenge the termination until many months
after it had taken effect; and the presence of the requisite
state action in establishing and exercising the termination
procedure, taken together, justify the judgment of the District
Court in declaring the automatic supersedeas provision an
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process
of law.
Supreme Court Rejects Baksalary Appeal
On January 14, 1985, the U. S. Supreme Court, in an 8-0 decision,
rejected the appeal filed by Allstate, Argonaut, Harleysville, Royal,
Travelers and Wausau Insurance Companies and Sun Co., Inc., a self-insurer,
from the decision of a three-judge federal court invalidating the summary
termination provisions of Section 413(a) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act.
Acting on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss the Appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to affirm the lower court summarily,
the Supreme Court entered the following Order: "The appeal is dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens would affirm."
This Order effectively disposed of the Supreme Court appeal in this
case, leaving open only the final disposition of the appeal filed to the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That court granted a stay
of proceedings of its action, pending the dispostion of the jurisdictional
issue in the U. S. Supreme Court.
